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Divided Cities in the Middle East

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Comparative research challenges our preconceptions and promotes new theory. Looking beyond the familiar expands our imagination, calling attention to new subjects of study. Last year, this journal examined Chinese and Indian cities (*City & Community* 8:4). This issue of *City & Community* continues to promote research on urban social life beyond the United States, featuring three articles on Jerusalem and Beirut, divided cities in the Middle East.

This introduction places the articles in the broader context of two prominent urban themes. One is the distinctiveness of the ancient and ever-changing cities of the Middle East. Cities in the region certainly differ among themselves, but share some commonalities in history, spatial structure, political organization, and culture. However, that distinctiveness is eroding under the external influences of globalization, international politics, and neoliberal policies. The second theme in these articles is that of divided or contested cities. The authors apply more general theories of social and symbolic boundaries to urban sociology as well as theories of the social construction of urban space, its representational force and cultural significance. In Beirut and Jerusalem, contests over space are not merely conflicts between exchange value and use value, productive capital and collective consumption. Although class struggles are occurring and gated communities are springing up in the region, more deadly are conflicts about ethnonational identity and spiritual values, sovereignty and the sacred. Divided cities are polarized over religion, ethnicity, even nationality, so that conflicts over space, territory, and "turf" go beyond the rough and tumble of interest group pluralism, the class, ethnic, and racial clashes so familiar in U.S. urban politics. Although American cities do periodically erupt in communal violence, race riots and gang wars do not compare to the protracted fighting to control sacred sites between organized sectarian militias in the Middle East. Those combatants split cities right down the middle, with social boundaries marked by barricades, checkpoints, and walls. Europe has not escaped these deadly conflicts over urban space: Belfast, Mostar, Nicosia, and Sarajevo come to mind. Thus, Beirut and Jerusalem address general theoretical issues for urban sociologists and cities beyond the Middle East. They also offer lessons about boundary-making processes generally.

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MIDDLE EASTERN CITIES

Jerusalem, Beirut, and many other Middle Eastern cities date from classical antiquity, with histories long preceding cities like Chicago usually taken as models of urban development. Imperial and religious wars left physical imprints on their terrain. The very term "Middle East"—coined for the region between Britain and India—recalls the area's colonial past. History is therefore an essential component of any analysis of Middle Eastern cities, as it contributes to the selective construction of collective memory about place.

Older scholarly treatments during the heyday of modernization theory drew ideal types of cities in the region to contrast with cities in the West. In a period some characterize as a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993), it is tempting to draw a single portrait of "the Middle Eastern city" based upon an essentialist notion of ethnic culture. More recently, one hears the term "the Islamic city" based upon the noticeable but limited impact of religion on spatial form (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1987).[1] In a traditional Medina, sources of water determined the location of the Kasbah, citadel, or princely residence that was surrounded by ramparts or a city wall. Supported by agriculture in the hinterland, the Medina served as administrative seat, trading post, military base, and center of religious practice. Through the center, with the mosque and adjoining schools and hospices there ran a market, or *souk*, traditionally with artisan crafts as well as commerce and public bathhouses. Compared to Western self-governing medieval cities, the Medina had limited public space or central squares. A fine-grained transition led from these central pedestrian arteries to a web of more homogeneous, inward-looking quarters. Moving from public to private, one encountered the extended family's domain, the basic unit of society responsible for social control, and the cul-de-sacs of sacred inviolable homes, the traditional domain of women (Mechkat, 1987). In Islamic cities, the *waqf* system limited land speculation. Some religious buildings remain as *waqf*s today, allowing for the preservation of historical monuments in the classical style, especially the unmistakably Arab-arched architecture, calligraphic decoration, and domed roofs.[2] Thus, in some respects, Islam had a visible influence on Arab cities.

Historically speaking, Muslim cities may have actually been more hospitable to social diversity than European ones. In empires prior to modern colonialism and nationalism, cities from Turkey to Egypt, including Palestine and the Levant, tolerated numerous minorities and sects: Shi'a, Alewi and Kurd, Copt and Armenian, Orthodox and Maronite Christian, Druze, Bedouin, and Jew. A conventional mythic narrative in the Middle East recounts how the arrival of Islam in the seventh century allowed Muslims, Jews, and Christians to interact relatively freely with one another, "creating a symbiotic space, especially in Jerusalem, where the sacred spaces of all three communities formed a complicated mosaic that took synergistic form" (Samman, 2006, p. 210). This idyllic and pacific discourse of a so-called "golden age" of intercommunal coexistence in Middle Eastern cities is, like so many others, imagined and selective. It neglects the intercommunal violence in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century and hides the second-class citizenship of *dhimmis*, non-Muslim protected peoples (Munro, 1987). Nevertheless, Jerusalem and Beirut have indisputably been multiconfessional, if fragmented places, not the polarized cities they later became. Jerusalem's Old City contained Muslim, Christian, Armenian,

and Jewish Quarters. In Beirut, at least the Christian and Muslim *elites* got along well; until the 1980s, this consociational democracy imposed a traditional order on potentially feuding groups.

The Western gaze on daily life in Middle Eastern cities is sometimes Orientalized (Said, 1978). Europeans may imagine them as dangerous, threatening, or violent. To be sure, governance problems abound in Middle Eastern cities, and confrontations between autocratic states and citizens demanding rights are common (Chaoul, 2007). Alternatively, souks, coffeehouses, and the Kasbahs may have an exotic allure. Such stereotypical images flatten the differences among cities of the Middle East. In fact, there are clearly important variations or subtypes among these cities, partly as a consequence of their different roles in the global order.

Urbanization in the region fit easily with neither dependency theory nor decolonization models, perspectives that did not accommodate the great diversity of Middle Eastern states and political economies. Nineteenth-century European colonialism surely transformed the traditional Medina. For example, Beirut, which was just a small town among many Mediterranean ports before the French arrived, flourished as a conduit between the European Mediterranean and the Arab world. Beirut became the region's financial and intellectual center, a role it is now regaining. Western powers favored coastal cities over inland ones, the better to extract native wealth and reach local markets through the ports. Later, railroads and airports were constructed, often by wholesale destruction of older buildings. As European trade with the Far East expanded, however, local handicraft industries, like the silk woven in the Lebanese mountains, were undermined. Instead, the growing oil industry and finance—linking the city to external powers—provided a new regional niche in the global economy.

Abu-Lughod (1984) identified at least four "modes of production" that distinguish how Middle Eastern countries urbanized. First, in neocolonial states like Tunisia and Morocco, with primate ports, outsourced exports—a "new international putting-out system"—and tourism remained heavily dependent upon Europe. Second, state socialist or Baathist states like Algeria, Syria, and Iraq radically broke with past colonizers and instead developed command economies. Third, "charity cases," including Jordan, Egypt, and the cases in this issue, Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine, became dependent upon foreign aid, causing development to follow political considerations as much as the economic logic of tourism, finance, and culture. Fourth, the "Oil and Sand" states of the Gulf and Libya urbanized with the labor of "rent-a-slave" guest workers, more South Asian than Palestinian, who are ethnically segregated from the natives and from the Westerners.

The gulf cities of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and so on are now "display cases" and sites of consumption. Spectacularly oil-rich Gulf states have lavished funds on their cities, constructing signature skyscrapers, manmade islands, and gated communities. Western universities building campuses with the labor of imported contract workers sleeping in distant labor camps. Stark inequalities between citizens of the Gulf states and foreign nationals, and class and ethnic differences among citizens shape urban social life in the gleaming new cities of the Arab emirates (Lavergne, 2007; Nagy, 2006).

Whereas once there were colonial quarters in Arab cities exclusively for Westerners, now there are shopping malls, hotels, and pleasure palaces equally off limits to the working class. Atop the high rises of these global cities in the sky, robed Muslims and those

in Western dress enjoy dancing and alcohol in international nightclubs. Conspicuous oil wealth contrasts with the abject poverty in the informal housing areas of Cairo and refugee camps of Beirut.

Regional inequality has induced much migration from poorer to richer cities. In turn, migrants building the Gulf cities send remittances back in their cities of origin to build homes and make marriage possible. The oil states, Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular, are investing in real estate throughout the region. Rebuilding Cairo as a tourist city, for example, displaces the poor from downtown slum communities and mixes strangers in "modern" public housing of the periphery. These and other expressions of "neoliberal" globalization have increased the unemployed of Cairo, who left to take construction jobs elsewhere in the region. Indeed, no Middle Eastern city has received as much scholarly attention from contemporary urbanists as Cairo, the megacity of the Middle East (Abu-Lughod, 1971; Ghannam, 2002; Ismail, 2006; Singerman, 2009). There is even a newly minted "Cairo School of Urban Studies" working on new ways to think about Middle Eastern cities and the ambivalent experiences of globalization and neoliberalism (Singerman and Amar, 2006). This emerging perspective on urban studies promotes a sensibility toward ambivalence, "not as a consolation for making sense of a complex world, but as a requirement for understanding it" (Singerman, 2009).

Area specialists often complain that contemporary urban sociology has bypassed cities in the region. "The typical global city discourse has left out . . . cities in the Arab world," writes Elsheshtawy (2008, p. 5). Malkawi (2008) is surprised by the neglect of Arab cities in the literature, especially given the global religious centers of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Indeed, Jerusalem, like Mecca and Rome, is a "contested world city," a home to multiple transnational faiths, a place of both "God and Nationalism" (Samman, 2006). Middle Eastern cities manifest the same tensions as cities of other regions between global markets and informal economies, state collectivism and privatization, tradition and modernity, religiosity and secularism, nationalism and universalism.

The Cold War sorted Arab states into superpower spheres of influence as well as different positions in global markets. To this day, Middle Eastern cities are not only implicated in global capitalism and world religions, but perhaps most importantly in the geopolitical order. The strategic significance of Jerusalem and Beirut in the jockeying among regional and super powers cannot be understated. In fact, these capitals were repeatedly connected by war and foreign intervention. Given the pattern of international alliances, communal conflicts on the urban terrain are also proxy wars between distant states.

It is easy to see the profound and uneven effects of globalization on cities in the Middle East. Yasser Elsheshtawy has pointed to a "Great Divide" between what he calls "struggling" and "emerging" cities in "the Arab world." North African cities are reeling under imposed privatization and austerity policies, while Gulf cities are investing oil revenues to construct world-class financial, service, and tourist "meccas." The region's investment networks seem to have eluded Western global cities analysts. Since 9/11, however, there is no excuse for neglect.[3] Western military and corporate intervention in the Gulf is weakening these regional networks, drawing the Middle East further into the global economy. As Malkawi observes, Arab cities have been "outside the discourse on global or world cities," but "each and every urban place is part of a wider urban system, and can change at any point within the system" (2008, pp. 30–31).

CONTESTED CITIES

So far, I have considered what many Middle Eastern cities have in common, in contrast with American or European cities. Jerusalem and Beirut, by virtue of sharing a region of the world, bear some resemblance to each other, despite their many differences. Both are also internally divided by belief. Beirut and Jerusalem belong to a broader class of contested cities. Urban divisions between communities of faith are not confined to the Middle East; Belfast and Berlin, Mostar and Nicosia, Brussels and Montreal, have all suffered from ideological or ethnic separation, conflict, and violence. Such symbolic and aggressive struggles over control of urban space go well beyond the so-called "ethnic pluralism" or "identity politics" in diverse, multicultural cities familiar to Western urbanists (Morrissey and Gaffikin, 2006). The violence is of an entirely different order than urban riots.

Rather, contested cities face protracted political, ethnic, and religious conflicts over national sovereignty and cultural dominance. They are implicated in civil wars that threaten group identity. For example, the sectarian troubles in Belfast, the torture of opposing religious groups in Sarajevo, or the ideological confrontations across the Berlin Wall all entailed long-term geopolitical wars over the control of urban territory. Divided cities become polarized socially and segregated spatially. Within them, everyday urban governance is deeply contested, transforming mundane service delivery and land-use planning into ethnonational or sectarian conflicts over the control of space. Consequently, the public sphere shrinks and group interaction shrivels. Once "intimate enemies" now weave tales of victimhood, seek vengeance through retaliations, and spoil attempts to settle disputes.

The growing scholarly literature on divided cities has identified common patterns of urban polarization (Boal, 1995; Bollens, 1999; Bryan, 2003). Based upon a comparison of five contested cities, Calame and Charlesworth (2009) argue that urban division is a gradual, predictable, and avoidable sequence in which insecurity gives way to ethnic violence and internal partition. First, ethnic identity is politicized and serves as the basis of social organization. Often, indigenous old-timers resent newcomers who feel relative deprivation or minority disenfranchisement. Jerusalem and Beirut are not the only divided cities with a large population of displaced persons. In Belfast, for example, Catholics and Protestants were evicted from each other's areas and often, workplaces, increasing segregation (Boal, 1995; Bollens, 1999). Between 1969 and 1976, some 12 percent of Belfast's population was forced to relocate (Bryan, 2003, p. 252).

Second, insecurity and conflict are catalysts for the clustering of threatened communities who "stick to their own kind" for protection. Isolation imposes hardships that reinforce internal group cohesion. Third, enclaves assume political and symbolic significance, forcing residents to sacrifice for a larger cause. Fourth, the spatial boundaries between ethnically homogenous, politicized enclaves are drawn along dormant physical faultlines that become concrete and impermeable. Interfaces where ethnicities once mingled become dangerous no-go zones policed by the combatants and set off with markers. Public spaces become sites of greater, not less sectarian violence. Barricades become walls. Finally, states or external forces consolidate and institutionalize the boundaries in an effort to reduce bloodshed. Since the end of WWII, the international community has increasingly responded to ethnic conflict by reinforcing segregation for the protection of "civilians" on both sides.

In the meantime, residents of divided cities suffer from inefficiencies like duplication of services, out of the way journeys, economic depression, and chronic fear. Ultimately, the settlement of disputes may lead to the razing of barriers, but voluntary social segregation persists. Resolving root causes of the conflict requires negotiation over sovereignty or power-sharing (Bollens, 1999). Moreover, even after democratic elections, informal power-sharing may be more successful at integrating the city than are complex consociationalism and territorial division (Bieber, 2005).

Insofar as American urban sociology has not devoted much attention to the themes of contested cities or the distinctiveness of cities in the Middle East, it is worthwhile to introduce some historical background on Beirut and Jerusalem in particular. This serves to contextualize the articles in this issue.

BEIRUT, A DIVIDED CITY

"Beirut's recovery is similar to that of other divided cities within contested states which are subject to regional pressures and international interventions," writes Craig Larkin in his contribution to this issue. "Unlike Jerusalem, where the struggle is over contested national sovereignty (Israel and Palestinian Authority) and increasingly exclusive religio-political ideologies (Zionism and Islamism), Beirut's battle lines are drawn over the nature of the Lebanese nation-building project and the elusive search for *aysh mushtarak* or 'shared life' within the confines of Lebanon's consociational arrangements."

Nation-building in Lebanon has always been a challenge. After the French Mandate, Beirut enjoyed a postcolonial revitalization. Sometimes called the "Paris of the Middle East," Beirut's bank secrecy laws made it the financial center of the region, with much trade moving through its port and tourists visiting through its airport to enjoy the beachfront hotels and ample nightlife. Beirut became the Arab world's Disneyland. It was also a city of refuge for dissident Arab intellectuals, such as Syrian migrants fleeing the Baathist regime, who established publishing houses and taught at the universities.

Beirut has some 17 or 18 religious sects and secular groups. They traditionally coexisted, living in separate enclaves, but some neighborhoods were religiously mixed. Although Beirut's old city walls and ramparts are now gone, the nineteenth-century fortification walls and Phoenician archeological ruins demarcated the main boundary between Christians in the East and Muslims in the South and West of the city. That border was further reinforced during the sectarian violence of 1956–1958 and with disruptions of constitutional power-sharing arrangements.

The southern outskirts of Beirut became home to migrants from the rural mountains and Palestinian refugees. These "camp-cities" (Agier, 2007) burgeoned after "Black September" of 1970, when Jordan drove out more Palestinians. The quarter-million Palestinian refugees are not citizens; they were even barred from property ownership and the professions. Public discourse treated the displaced like interlopers and outsiders, premodern people unfit for urban life, exiles in their own city, "betwixt and between" (Sawalha, 2003). But refugees become inhabitants, camps become cities. Ultimately, the disenfranchised Palestinians attacked Israel, which led to retaliatory raids and invasions by Israel, Syria, and other forces, raining down destruction on the Lebanese as well.

Christian, Druze, and Muslim Lebanese engaged in a civil war from 1975 to 1990. By the end of 1975, downtown Beirut had become a battleground patrolled by snipers nesting in high-rise hotels. Roads were closed. Commerce ended. Residents of mixed areas moved

out. Central Beirut became a rubble-strewn no-man's land. This "Green Line" divided the city along an axis stretching from Martyrs' Square, the quintessential public space in the historic center, out to the refugee camps in the periphery. The government was displaced. Key service firms, international banks, insurance and publishing companies left Beirut. The city was spatially fragmented into militia-controlled "mini-states," which gradually polarized into two camps. By the end of the civil war, one fourth of Beirut's housing units were damaged or demolished, some having been bulldozed to allow movement of military vehicles, and half the population had temporarily or permanently left their homes (Sawalha, 2003, p. 272). Property rights became jumbled for long-term squatters who sought refuge in abandoned apartments and owners whose buildings were damaged. In 1990, the civil war ended, elections were held, and the military checkpoints policing the vacant chasm of the Green Line were dismantled.

Just as the destroyed downtown gave material expression to the stalemate of the civil war, so its reconstruction symbolized the rebuilding of the entire country. Already by the mid 1980s, Beirut's elites planned to rebuild the downtown as a public space for interconfessional mixing, much as the old souks had catered to Muslims and Christians, Arabs and Westerners.

The postwar government, led by Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, moved to reconstruct the CBD, including the airport, port, and highways.[4] To plan and manage the renewal, it created a joint stock company, the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut, or Solidere (its French acronym). This public-private partnership adopted the unifying slogan, "Beirut, an Ancient City for the Future." Land owners received shares in the company to capitalize it, and other shares were sold on the market to Lebanese citizens and Arabs. The agency received powers of eminent domain to redevelop the central city. Although Solidere initially planned for the historic preservation of some buildings, it demolished most of the historic core and built modern buildings on top of it, displacing inhabitants in the process. Centered again on Martyrs' Square, new souks and shopping malls began to encourage public interaction or at least copresence among diverse groups. The reconstruction of the downtown into a modern but socioeconomically isolated district created a new playground for a global, especially rich Arab elite (Shwayrik, 2008). Indeed, Solidere's "Disney-fied" Beirut has become a model for urban development in other Arab cities like Amman; multinational construction corporations from the Arab Gulf, like Sama Dubai, are building cities in its image elsewhere in the region.

The "global city" center has not entirely excluded the "popular" classes. In precivil war Beirut, as in Paris, there was a tradition of political parties orchestrating massive demonstrations, marching from the poorer quarters of the south to the seat of government to make their views known. Although the center was off limits to marches for much of the 1970s and 1980s, the end of the fighting brought a new form of popular expression in the downtown (Chaoul, 2007). Indeed, in 2007, after another war with Israel, and in a reprise of the April 23, 1969, Palestinian altercations, protestors occupied the square and demanded a change in government. Residents are also resisting the Solidere "growth machine" transforming central Beirut into a global tourist city through their spontaneous and informal uses of public space for the arts or demonstrations (Esheshtawy, 2008).

Since 2007, the economy has grown almost 9 percent annually. Slowly, real estate investment, banks, cargo, and tourism are returning to Beirut. Nevertheless, the modern infrastructure of the downtown contrasts with the persistent penury of the refugee camps

and slums formed after the Israeli and Syrian occupations and Hizbollah violence of the last decade. The city is still ethnically divided, although neighborhoods have been remade and new populations have arrived. The successive wars not only destroyed the urban infrastructure, but also the urban social fabric. As in most Middle Eastern cities, stark economic inequality and uneven development are the norm. Urban prosperity is contingent on geopolitics.

Craig Larkin's analysis of postcivil war Beirut addresses the ways that postwar youth remember, imagine, and spatially encounter a city previously rent by a no man's land and punctuated by no-go zones. Beirut has since rebuilt the center, but inscribed some remnants of the war in the urban landscape as part of the official touristic narrative of a phoenix repeatedly rising from the ashes. The practical, vernacular, political uses of the city's reconstructed public spaces reveal the formation of new local identities and social interaction across deep and lasting boundaries. Rebuilding the divided city entails selective memory and forgetting, nostalgia for the past and aspirations for the future. In addition to physical reminders and interaction across social boundaries in public space, Beiruti youth imagine the city through the lens of memories transmitted to them by the older generation but colored by present conditions. Applying Lefebvre's three interconnecting modes of socially produced space—the perceived, the conceived, and the lived—Zukin's arguments about authentic urban space, and the distinction between history and heritage, Larkin identifies how a new generation imbues space with memory and identity, uses it in new ways, both reproducing and transcending older social and spatial boundaries of the city.

JERUSALEM: RETHINKING CITY WALLS

Walls are one of the earliest manifestations of cities. "The wall continued to be one of the most prominent features of the city, in most countries, right down to the eighteenth century—the chief exceptions being early Egypt, Japan, and England [or] in Imperial Rome and Imperial China" (Mumford, 1961, p. 63). Ur, Erbil, and Babylon started around fortified citadels, and their expansion is marked with mural rings and the differentiation of quarters, enclaves, and neighborhoods. Max Weber considered the wall essential to a definition of the city.[5] The citadel protected the medieval hinterland. The town gate was a meeting place between insider and outsider where numerous border transactions took place. The walled city was also a site of temples, courts, and markets. Lewis Mumford noted that in ancient cities, "besides the functions of military defense and control, of religious unification and protection, the wall...established a clean, formal contrast between town and country" (1961, p. 67). It enclosed the population like an island, providing a sense of unity and insularity. Divided cities are "heir to the mural tradition of urban fortification," Calame and Charlesworth (2009, p. 18) contend, because of the "intensification of group solidarity, the promotion of a siege mentality, and the deepening commitment to a moribund insularity." In brief, walls "define" and "divide," unify and exclude social groups.

The Old City of Jerusalem remains a place of walls within walls, sitting atop a hill surrounded by ancient stones. Despite its ancient fortifications, Jerusalem suffered over 20 sieges, changed hands over 25 times, and was destroyed 17 times (Cattan, 1987). A walled city since antiquity, the current walls date from 1542, built by the Ottoman

Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (Cattan, 1987). Within them are other walls, the "Wailing Wall" that once contained the Second Temple and above it, the walled Al-Aqsa mosque compound.

Rebuilding a city on top of ruins of the old one is an ancient practice. To the victor go the spoils, the right to selectively write history. History, with its claim to truth, can be turned into heritage, with a 'prejudiced pride in the past' (Lowenthal, 1998, pp. 5–24). Forgetfulness may facilitate reconciliation, but can also rekindle conflict. Berlin's reunification, for example, was marked by controversies over the triumphal connotations of the demolition of the socialist Palace of the Republic, itself constructed in 1976 on the site of the bombed-out, baroque, imperial *Stadtschlos* (Häußermann, 1999; Silver, 2010). In Jerusalem, new developments on annexed land act to efface Palestinian memories of what came before. Indeed, Jerusalem gives a new meaning to the idea of central city "annexation" of the suburbs. Jerusalem has long ago outgrown its Old City walls.

As the archeological digs in Jerusalem's Old City demonstrate, memory can later be recovered. Shlay and Rosen, in their article in this issue, do some archeology of their own, tracing how the Green Line separating warring forces has shifted over time. Like Beirut, the divided city of Jerusalem is administratively and physically reunited but religiously fragmented. Unlike Beirut, Jerusalem marks the border between two nations. Delineating the city limits is of geopolitical significance.

From 1949 to 1967, the Green Line marked the international armistice lines between East and West Jerusalem. By 1962, the armistice line consisted of a physical barricade of barbed wire through a mined no man's land, with ramparts and blocked roads. During this period, the city was an economic backwater. Jordan had preferred to invest in Amman; Tel Aviv grew faster than the mountainous, hemmed-in Jerusalem. After the Six Day War, the two halves of the city were reunited by fiat, and the Green Line was dismantled. However, Jews and Arabs still avoid each other's sections. The "wall in people's minds," to use a metaphor from Berlin, has remained.

It is currently joined by another one, the Israeli security "fence" built through the city which is, like its predecessors, ostensibly a defensive wall. However, in this case, the material spatial boundary is also intended to create a social, indeed international one. "The Wall that runs through Jerusalem is not simply erected on naturally marked border, but is itself constructed in order to naturalize an otherwise artificial division" (Samman, 2006, p. 213).

Shlay and Rosen describe how the Israeli state actively made and remade the place called Jerusalem by shifting the city border over time. International diplomacy, military calculations, and conventional urban development policies—zoning, highway, light rail, and other planning tools—are creating the built environment in a manner that simultaneously unifies and fragments space. However, this state-based place-making is not uncontested. Palestinians and international actors resist Israeli practices and legal interpretations. The continuing conflict over what constitutes the boundaries of Jerusalem is highly symbolic.

REBUILDING THE PUBLIC REALM

As Nir Gazit points out in his article here, boundaries simultaneously include and exclude. Boundary-making is a dialectical process between self and other. Jewish Jerusalem

may be united behind the Green Line, but it is also internally fractured along many lines of cleavage, especially between observant and secular Jews who live in different neighborhoods and hold different opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Gazit discusses how a local newspaper, *Kol Ha'ir*, one of many possible urban artifacts, has the "cultural power," to use Griswold's term (1987), to create consensus and shared identity by allowing for various interpretations. The newspaper is "a cultural, metonymic representation of the city," a polysemous cultural object, amenable to diverse meanings.

The social construction of the city, Gazit argues, is an intersubjective project in "a semi-closed world of communication and shared symbolization." Despite few social relations between members of different communities in Jerusalem, there is communication of ideas and identities across boundaries. For religious and secular alike, Jewish Jerusalem thus acquires a unified local culture in contrast to both Tel Aviv and the Arab "Other," mediating across segregated communities and creating *imagined* interactions among them. The newspaper also constructs internal boundaries, including the secular and excluding the growing ultraorthodox population, including the Jews and excluding the Arabs, allowing each to peer at the other without actually interacting. In sum, the boundary work entails the maintenance and transcendence of divisions, the construction of identity both narrow and broader.

Gazit's analysis is applicable to other multicultural cities that simultaneously reproduce separation and create a common public sphere. For example, the bullet-pocked "Martyrs Memorial" in Beirut's central square is, like *Kol Ha'ir*, a polysemic artifact both consensual and diversely symbolic. It stands for the unity of Lebanese suffering in a war that has various interpretations. The "inclusive ambiguity" of such memorials allows groups to transcend social boundaries in a particular symbolic space.

Both Beirut and Jerusalem are publishing centers where intellectual and political discourse contributes to a lively public sphere. Historically, Beirut was the cultural center of the Arab world. With each new wave of political exiles and refugees, more and more publishing houses were established (Mermier, 2007). Although Cairo and the Gulf states currently compete with Beirut for intellectual leadership among Arabic readers, Lebanon's comparatively weak state has allowed for freer expression than have authoritarian states. Jerusalem too is an intellectual, cultural, and international media center where free speech is plentiful if cacophonous.

For Jürgen Habermas, *Öffentlichkeit*, the public sphere, was a free space of critical discussion, open to all. It existed outside state control and kept state power in check. Newspapers, like lodges, clubs, cafes, and other liberal institutions, gave rise to rational communication, critical thinking, and public reason. Newspapers and other media create a "community of sentiment" allowing groups to feel or imagine together (Appadurai, 1997). While one may debate the fate of the public sphere in Europe,[6] the Middle East is witnessing a newfound flourishing of civil society. Although repression continues, autocratic states are finding it increasingly difficult to control the mass media in an age of the internet, satellite television, and cell phone, and, as Larkin demonstrates, the younger generation in these societies is getting information from diverse sources and thinking more independently. There are more and more counterpublics, "discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses...in response to exclusions within dominant publics" (Fraser, 1990, p. 67). If divided cities give way to public spaces, social boundaries may yet be crossed.

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Notes

[1] Generally speaking, Islamic cities are distinctive in (1) social structure, distinguishing believers from nonbelievers who lived in distinct quarters; (2) gender segregation, sheltering women from men; and (3) decentralized neighborhood decision-making about land use and defensive social control (Abu-Lughod, 1987). However, religious doctrine was not the only force involved in shaping the distinctive forms of these cities. The idea that there is a single "Islam" that influences urban culture, however ideal the aspiration for a universal Umma, elides important differences among Muslims and between regions like North Africa, India, and Asia Minor. Gendered space was less noticeable in agricultural areas and lower class housing; it is not true of "Islamic" space everywhere.

[2] Unfortunately, preservation efforts are uneven (Tung, 2001). Beirut's old city was demolished and rebuilt upon long before the civil war began, indeed, even before Lebanese independence. As Larkin shows in this issue, the latest reconstruction of the downtown has been no more attentive to preservation than the earlier renewal.

[3] Before 9/11, Americans rarely thought about urban warfare in the literal sense. The metaphors of "Fortress LA," "places of terror," and "space police" (Davis, 1990) were exaggerations of the militarization of municipal forces of order. Until 2001, Europeans were more likely to know true acts of urban terrorism that target public space to undermine social trust and civility and encourage retreat into the private or communal realms (Savitch, 2005). The "war on terror" has heightened the dualism between U.S. "homeland" space redesigned and overpoliced to increase security and Arab cities conceived as "terrorist nests" or targets of American-dominated colonialism (Graham, 2006).

[4] Hariri was a prominent Sunni Muslim businessman who served as Prime Minister from 1992 to 1998, and 2000 to 2004. He was assassinated in 2005 by a bomb that, many believe, had Syrian origins.

[5] Weber (1978) distinguished the ideal types of Occidental and Oriental cities based upon the "sworn confraternity" or "burgher association" of city-dwellers within the walls separating the urban order from the feudal one. In near eastern cities, Weber maintained, the commune was absent or rudimentary, with the partial exception of the Jews, who ruled themselves theocratically.

[6] Habermas (1962) argued that the Western mass media eventually turned citizens into passive subjects, and the "public sphere" became a realm of self-interest instead of civic virtue.

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